, and that we are experiencing what some employment law theorists refer to as the term "second generation" invites us to imagine a sharp divide or discontinuity between employment discrimination today and employment discrimination in the aftermath of Jim Crow, one can question its descriptive and historical accuracy. But if one understands "second generation" to be about salience and context-namely, that the salience of and the context in which racial discrimination occurs today differs from the Jim Crow era-the 
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What forms of discrimination are likely to be salient in the coming decade flags a cluster of problems that roughly fall under the rubric of inclusive discrimination by inclusion. Much contemporary discrimination theory a work is concerned not simply with mapping the forces that keep p market but also with identifying the forces that push them into hierarchi within workplaces and labor markets. Underwriting this effort is the notion determining precisely what happens before and during the moment in whi prospective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remai anti-discrimination theory and practice, significant employment discrim can occur after a person is hired and becomes an employee. These prob racial and sexual harass
olarship will engage these "after inclusion"workplace difficulties-theo empirically and doctrinally. .
I. Introduction
Employment discrimination today is not what it was when Congre il Rights Act of 1964. There are a number of ways to articulate this emphasize the shift from explicit animus to implicit bias. (Kang 2005 ) Othe language of de jure and de facto discrimination to characterize the difference 1960s and the present. (Harris 2005 ) Still others ground their comp distinction between conscious or purposeful discrimination, on the on unconscious or accidental discrimination, on the other. (Krieger 1995; Lawr Notwithstanding the competing rhetorical registers in which scholar differences between discrimination then and now, there is consensus th difference, that much of contemporary discrimination has gone underg "second generation" discrimination. (Sturm 2001) To the extent Faculty at UCLA, UC Irvine, and Duke, respectively. Thanks to Lauren Edelman for comments. term has purchase. Consider conscious racial animus. While a claim that discrimination has disappeared would be difficult to sustain, most wou conscious racial animus is not as prevalent a social practice as it once was and is no salient. Moreover, because of shifts in our legal and social norms about context in which racial animus is practiced and experienced transcends the d and includes the ladder of advancement. In this respect, the challenge of em is to respond not just to new forms of discrimination (be they structural, p cultural or inter-personal) but to the fact that different forms of d this form of ld agree that t as equality, the oor of access ployment law sychological, iscrimination shift in and out contexts, as a and in what rimination are lems that we lusion. Much ply with the ush them into r way, while before and during the moment in which a pro to pay more an employee. nclusion and at blacks are this argument s institutional ificant numbers from partnership (i.e., as institutional lead uded from (or les, inclusion n of inclusive e differentiated from exclusionary models of disc inclusion are ary models of ep people out sed for many door-opening While access is important, the story of discrimination does not end at the moment of access. Inclusion in does not mean the absence of discrimination from. Under certain conditions, an employer's desire to grant access coexists with discriminatory policies and practices. Put another way, access can both reflect and facilitate discrimination. Below we explain how this is so in the context of assessing recent trends in discrimination theory, empirical work, and litigation. Our focus is on racial discrimination, but race discrimination is often not separable from discrimination based on other aspects of of salience, and become particularly "sticky" in different employment function of the historical backdrop within which the discrimination occurs.
Which brings us to the central question this Essay engages: How context is discrimination imagined to occur today and what forms of disc likely to be salient in the coming decade? We focus on a cluster of prob situate under the rubric of inclusive exclusions or discrimination by inc contemporary discrimination theory and empirical work is concerned not sim forces that keep people out of the labor market but also with forces that p hierarchical structures within workplaces and labor markets. Put anothe determining precisely what happens spective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remains crucial to anti-discrimination theory and practice, employment scholars are beginning attention to what happens to that person after she is hired and becomes What happens, in other words, after inclusion?
Scholars across disciplines have noted the ways in which i marginalization often go hand in hand. Think of the widespread claim th second class citizens within the legal profession. Part of what underwrites is the empirical fact that while law firms include blacks as associates (i.e., a workers) they exclude them in sign ers). (Wilkins 1998 (Wilkins , 2007 Conley 2006) Or consider the problem of workplace ghettoization: women are included in academia and the professions but excl ghettoized in) certain areas of specialization. (Schultz 1990) In both examp precedes and creates a condition of possibility for exclusion, thus our notio exclusions or discrimination by inclusion.
Discrimination by inclusion should b rimination, that is, models of discrimination within which exclusion and mutually exclusive and oppositional social dynamics. Central to exclusion discrimination are three core ideas: (1) that discrimination functions to ke by closing the doors of access, (2) that doors in the labor market remain clo people, and (3) that judges should employ anti-discrimination law as a mechanism-that is, as a vehicle to facilitate access. identity, such as gender, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. (Crensh structure our discussion around the following eight themes: (1) preferential intellectual capital; (3) legal endogeneity and the behavior of compliance p (4) incomplete consciousness; (5) performance and assimilation; aw 1993) We inclusion; (2) rofessionals; (6) rational discrimination and accommodation; (7) intra-racial discrimination; and (8) Another form of preferential inclusion is word-of-mouth hiring practices. They tend to produce ethnically or linguistically homogenous work forces. An example is an immigrant-run business that favors immigrant workers and employs word-of-mouth hiring to effectuate that preference. Does this practice provide employment opportunities for a group who might otherwise have difficulty finding jobs, or does it discriminate against other groups? The proliferation of nail salons in many U.S. cities brings this question into sharp relief. To a considerable extent, these salons are ethnic enclaves endogeneity.
Preferential Inclusion
Historically, exclusion constituted the quintessential form of discrim this might still be true today. But per se exclusion does not exhaust how d operates. Discrimination can still occur after or at the moment of inc scholars employ this very observation to challenge the legitimacy of affirm policies. For these scholars, affirmative action increases the representa minorities by including them on unfair terms. This understanding of affir explains why various forms of social inclus reach efforts) are referred to as "racial preferences." (Sander 2006 , 200 do not view affirmative action in this way, the "racial preference" character policy illustrates that the notion that inclusion can facilitate or be pre preferences already has social traction.
Preferential inclusion, or instances in which an employer prefers o over another based on problematic terms, occurs in many forms, some o directly linked to assumptions about the kind of worker the employee is like inclusion. Consider the relationship between preferential inclusion an segmentation of occupations. Imagine an employer who wants a workforce uncomplaining employees who have a strong work ethic and are unlikely rigorous compliance with workplace laws. Such an employer might prefer Latino/a immigrants, especially those who have an ingrained fear of the authorities. (Rodriguez 2007 ) The employer prefers not to hire whit American employees because he believes that they have a higher likeliho trouble, agitating for better conditions, and filing legal charges. T usion is based on expectations about the ways in which Latinas/os will n relationship to hierarchy and authority within the workplace after they are these preferred Latino/a employees have a claim against the employer on th the employer's preference for them was based on problematic racial stereot terms upon which the Latino/a workers included illegally discriminatory, they appear to have been beneficiaries rather than victims of stereotype discr dominated by recent Vietnamese immigrants. Is this affirmative action for discrimination against others? Courts have generally rejected challenges mouth hiring, notwithstanding that this practice produces ethnically workforces. (Cao 2003) One question is whether there will be a shift in approach, particularly against a backdrop of empirical studies based on ce suggest that racial and ethnic discrimination at the workplace level is per studies indicate that ethnic discrimination is especially acute among white workers, that there was no decline in racial and ethnic workplace segrega (Hernandez 2007 (Carbado 2005; Agamben 1998) Now that scholars, lawyers and judges understand discrimination to include norms and practices that define the terms on which racial or ethnic groups are included in the workplace, the ambit of legally relevant behavior has expanded. No longer is the question solely whether particular policies close the doors to employment opportunities. The ways in which doors to employment are opened can themselves facilitate discrimination and will be a central area of study. We can no longer afford to think about unchanged over the decade, black-white segregation increased by abou (Hellerstein, Neumark & McInerney 2007) .
Preferential inclusion can occur not only based on perceived race o also based on perceived behaviors. Sexual harassment presents a case in po MacKinnon is credited with pioneering work establishing that a supervisor enforced demand that an employee submit to sexual overtures as a conditio promotion is illegal sex discrimination. (MacKinnon 1979) But more su preference based on pliability remain of uncertain legal status. A manager in sexual banter with his attractive female employees and rewards those favorably with promotions, pay bonuses, mentorship and training discrim those employees who do not wish to participate in the manager's workplace The unconsenting employees are left alone; they are forced to endure no sex neither do they receive mentoring or the supervisory attention that enhances for promotion. It is unclear whether they can bring a sex discrimination being included within the ambit of a sexually charged set of interactio discrimination because it denies them, among other things, the benefits of m the manager's preference for women who are willing go along with h behavior a form of preferential inclusion?
One of the ways in which human resource departments have resp nexus between a sexualized workplace and sex discrimination law is to disf fraternizing that might lead to sexual harassment liability-such as so dinner and drinks with subordinates of the opposite sex. If the effect of thi is to deny young female employees the opportunity to mingle informally w supervisors, it is unclear whether the women's equal employment opportu anced or harmed by the policy. (Thomas 1990 ). This helps explain why s scholars have begun to argue that sexually sanitizing the workplace is not and often obfuscates gender inequality within the workplace. (Schultz 2003 
Intellectual Capital
Inequality in intellectual capital is today one of the principal con discrimination studies. Formal education and technical skill are perhaps m today than at any time in American history. (Stone 2006; Fisk 2005) With American manufacturing and the decline of union density in jobs requirin college education, real wages for workers with only a high school educatio fallen, whereas real wages for the highly educated have increased. (Rosé 2005) Many scholars and policy makers argue that differences in educa provide at least a partial explanation for the growing gap between rich an United States and globally, for the under-representation of certain races in s their over-representation in others, and for a variety of other inequalities i of incarceration, family structure, and health. They also contribute to st levels of job satisfaction, employment security, pay, and the availabil bility, and retirement insurance. More generally, some of the standard well-being are linked to levels of educational attainment. The pattern of inclusion a exclusion of racial groups in the workplace is thus linked to inequalities capital.
Yet education today is unequal, particularly with respect to race. M years after Brown v. Board of Education declared de jure race segregati education unconstitutional, primary and secondary education remains racial (Clotfelter 2004; Parker 2003 Parker , 2001 . As in the pre-Brown era, non-white significantly under-resourced in comparison to their white counterparts offer an inferior education. Efforts of school districts and universi enrollment plans to ensure integration have been invalidated by the Sup (Siegel 2007) . And legal challenges to unequal resources are difficult to mo met with only limited success. (Koski 2007) . To some extent, lawyers t more difficult doctrinal position arguing for racial equality in the context than their pre-Brown counterparts. They can ar urces. Pre-Brown, the latter argument was constitutionally cogniza 2002). Although minorities are no longer formally excluded from equa opportunity and are, in theory, entitled to equal expenditures on educatio equality of access to education masks inequality in the terms on which minority s are included in educational institutions. What remain are schools that segregated and non-white schools that are under-funded.
Against this backdrop, a narrative has emerged that attributes racial schools, he is also clear that at least part of the black community is in need reconstruction-and that many in the black community recognize this. Obama, "go into any inner city neighborhood, and folks will tell you tha alone can't teach kids to learn. . Now ess systemic egregation in he notion that significantly al achievement. As suggested earlier, the not outcomes will inate inequalities in education (among other places) is the widespread skepticism about whether the law should be explicitly redistributivist. Still another explanation has to do with merit-namely, that affirmative action-like policies are preferences that undermine merit and unfairly burden and/or discriminate in the reverse against whites (and Asian Americans). (Harris & Narayan 1994; Crenshaw 2007) .
This last argument about merit and reverse discrimination occupies much space in contemporary debates. As the value of elite education and technical job skills rises and ieve unless we raise their expectations and turn off the television sets the slander that says a black youth with a book is acting white." (Obama 200 As access to knowledge and intellectual capital becomes more important in the postindustrial workplace, questions about the relationship between racial employment and educational inequality also become more salient. Race segregation at the workplace tends to be self-perpetuating, and racial m women of all races are over-represented in lower-paying jobs and at economic periphery where they face greater risk of layoffs during econom (Reskin, McBrer & Kmec 1999) . The task of identifying the causes of raci segmentation in labor markets and its relationship to inequality is comp Bielby 1980 ), but it is clear that both discrimination by and within firms an in the attainment of skills and knowledge play a role. Scholars have understand what part of the under-representation of blacks in elite labor professions, business, and academia-is attributable to differences in educa and what part is attributable to bias. As with investments in schooling, on whether part of the story has to do with inadequate investments by black firm-specific capital, which then results in inadequate investment in them b end result of which would be a lower success rate for even those blacks wh inclusion within firms. Perceptions of discrimination may provide one ex e lower investment levels. Thus far, there has been little research on Even when scholars agree that historical and contemporary discrimination p partial role in explaining the differences in educational attainment across they often disagree about whether employers should-or even can affirmative action programs to correct for that discrimination.
Even as social scientists have shown the pervasiveness of racial s education and work and the dire consequences for workforce equalit integration, some judges and some legal scholars are less optimistic than th were about the power of courts to equalize societal differences (Tushnet there is controversy over the very idea that law should or can addr inequalities in education, intellectual capital, and health or pervasive racial s housing, education, or occupations. Part of the controversy has to do with t individual agency and responsibility on the part of (especially) blacks could change the level of black peoples' education ion is that blacks need to change themselves and positive educational follow. Another explanation for the fact that law is less available today to elim competition to attain them intensifies, affirmative action policies are vulnerable to the critique that they are unfair because they instantiate p candidates with less intellectual capital. Already, the legal debate is less a employers discriminate against people of color with lower levels of form attainment by failing to examine their hiring or promotion criteria rigor whether they needlessly cause a disparate impact (as was supposed in the Griggs v. Duke Power Co.) and more about whether employers dis attempting to do so. (Sander 2006 portant part of ly not all, of inclusion. In g employers s of hostile work environment. One of the mechanisms through which they hav employers to iscrimination thinking has intuitive appeal: diversity training makes employees more aware of the multiple forms employment discrimination can take; and this awareness reduces the likelihood that the employees will engage in behavior that a legal decision-maker would conclude is discriminatory.
But compliance professionals do more than "norm" workplace behavior; they also "norm" anti-discrimination law itself. To the extent there is adoption of the procedures compliance professionals prescribe, it is possible that courts and other regulators will ial policies that allow intergenerational upw ation appears to be easier for elites.
(Malam c

Legal Endogeneity and Compliance Professionals
Part of managing a firm entails translating and operationalizing including anti-discrimination regimes. Managers have to understand w commands and then institutionalize that understanding into concrete workpl This is no easy task. Legal prescriptions are often both unclear and Certainly this is true of anti-discrimination law. When does a racial joke c and create a hostile environment? What kind of affirmative actions progra Under what circumstances does a facially neutral employment policy (e.g hire persons without a high school diploma or with any criminal record) ca disparate racial or gendered impact? An industry of compliance prof emerged to help firms make sense of the foregoing questions, among surprisingly, empirical research on discrimination attempts to understand significance of compliance professionals in shapin itutional behaviors. Compliance professionals translate vague legal prescriptions specific in protocols. In this sense, compliance professionals are legal agents. They determine how an institution negotiates its relationship to anti-discrim (Edelman, Uggen & Erlanger 1999; Dobbin & Kalev 2007 The now-ubiquitous practice of diversity training has become an im managing the problem of workplace discrimination. Much, though certain this training focuses on employment discrimination issues that arise after particular, compliance professionals have played a crucial role in helpin address issue e done so is diversity training. Compliance professionals encourage utilize diversity training as an institutional mechanism to reduce the risk of d law suits and increase the likelihood of successfully defending them. The internalize these prescriptions. The prescriptions become formally folded To continue with the diversity training example, a judge or jury might presence of absence of diversity training as relevant to the question of employer created a hostile work environment. Understood this way professionals are legal agents not only in the sense of interpreting the law b of shaping the content of law. Pointedly, compliance professionals const laws they pu into the law. point to the whether the , compliance ut in the sense itute the very rport to institutionalize. Law 
Incomplete Consciousness
The four decades' worth of legal and social science scholarship since the federal prohibition of employment discrimination has established that simply outlawing the exclusion of minorities was not enough to ensure that minorities were included in numbers equal to their representation in the relevant labor market. In trying to determine why minorities are still underrepresented, scholars have focused particularly on the legal r prescriptions. (Edelman 2005 , Edelman, Fuller & Mara Drita 2001 Suchman 1999 The endogeneity of anti-discrimination mandates is especially li where regulation is difficult. Under such circumstances, the regulators have to allow the regulated to devise and implement the legal regimes und regulated will operate their businesses. In this way, the regulated become s which increases the likelihood that they will window-dress rather than institut et worse as the industry of compliance professionals grows in size and i larger and more influential this industry, the more it is likely to push its own agendas.
Even in the absence of this endogeneity problem, there is an empi about the efficacy of compliance professionals' prescriptions. Scholars are question whether compliance professionals help or hinder the el discriminati surprise us: The compliance professional industry seems to be benefitin professionals more than potential victims of discrimination. Put another diversity training is big business, but it is not clear that it helps the potent discrimination.
This raises a more general question about the efficacy of reform effo of employers to eliminate racism from the workplace. While legal schola to try systematically to assess the effects of litigation and institutional refo eliminating overt and subconscious discrimination, a host of questions re Hart 2005; Levit 2008) For example, what deterrent effect might be the threat of large damage and availability of employm study of anti-discrimination mandates in the next generation will b intertwined with the study of the compliance industry, an industry that, b investment in litigation and liability avoidance, is fundamentally concern happens to employees after inclusion. doctrine requiring that plaintiffs prove an adverse employment action was discriminatory intent. The law's emphasis on the motive of the employerthe harm to the victim -has been termed a "perpetrator perspective"; the m legal decision-makers to look for a bad person who acted consciously and in bring about some discriminatory result. (Freeman 1990 scholars who scientifically nscious racial way that law ic is being fought in the pages of law reviews, in which some scholars argue that social science evidence shows that unconscious and subconscious bias are pervasive and their pervasiveness justifies legal rules to remedy that bias (Kang & Banaji 2006) and other scholars argue that the evidence of a connection between unconscious bias and discriminatory conduct is weak or nonexistent. (Mitchell & Tetlock 2006) . The difficult methodological problem is to link evidence of pervasive bias drawn from the IAT and other types of psychological tests with evidence of pervasive racial inequality in employment. surprisingly, in today's labor market, every employer insists that i opportunity employer.
The legal requirements of proof of intent have generated doctrinal complexity. (Sullivan 2005; Zimmer 2004; Malamud 1994) Over the past the federal courts have ruled on a variety of evidentiary issues, such as: if made a racist remark but did so in a context other than in acting on a decis plaintiff's employment, is that remark evidence of bias or is it an irre remark"? Must a plaintiff adduce "direct" evidence of discriminatory circumstantial evidence sufficient? Is testimony by other employees ab discriminatory events that are similar to what the plaintiff alleged she relevant? Must a plaintiff who was passed over for promotion prove that th was promoted was less or equally qualified? As one doctrinal conflict is s one arises.
Apart from the doctrinal complexity, critics also assail the inten consequentialist grounds: there is pervasive racial inequality at work yet no to blame for it except, possibly, the victims themselves. Frustrated wi utes over structures of proving discriminatory intent which, plain believe, make it unduly difficult to prove a case, many legal scholars and so began to question the focus on intent vel non. What if discrimination is t subconscious or unconscious biases, biases beyond our conscious awarene 1995; Oppenheimer 1993) The notion of unconscious or negligent discrimination raises thor First, how do we know whether unconscious discrimination is a real Second, assuming that people do have unconscious racial desires or thou identify them? To answer these two questions, social psychologists have d Implicit Association Test (IAT), which measures reaction times to subtle r (Lane, Kang & Banaji 2007) . Their work has attracted the attention of legal employ it to argue that unconscious or subconscious discrimination is verifiable. (Kang & Banaji 2006) . If the IAT does indeed measure unco thinking, a third question arises: does such thinking affect conduct in a should recognize? A battle on this top An equally difficult legal problem is choosing a standard for proving between unequal outcomes in the absence of evidence of overt bias and a range of remedial measures. Should firms not hire people whose implicit b certain threshold? Should the law require firms to measure the cumulative im their workplaces as a way to ascertain whether an environment is rac Already scholars have begun to engage the issue of de-biasing-that is, whe be taken to remove or decrease our level of implicit bias (Bielby 2007; Jol 2006) . Should the law mandate that employers subject their employees t agents," in addition to or in lieu of the usual diversity training programs? (K 2006 race neutral w when the employer's facially race neutral claim that an employee has a poor attitude is racially infused? Consider this problem in the context of gender. When an accounting firm passed over a successful female partnership candidate on the grounds that she was too abrasive, the Supreme Court majority in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins could perceive the explanation as being possibly discriminatory because among the explanations partners gave for their decision was the advice that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear minority employees could take to reduce implicit bias? If assimilation norms reduces implicit bias, may firms require minorities to assimilate, as, by requiring black women to straighten their hair or by hiring only those wh
The difficulty of determining an appropriate standard of proof structure to deal with the problem of implicit bias relates to larger qu whether litigation is the right regulatory vehicle through which to combat Perhaps an ex ante regulatory solution (e.g es via psychological testing) might work better than an ex post litiga Perhaps the optimal schema would be one that entails an anti-discriminatio process to determine whether the firm has the appropriate protections in p that discrimination in that workplace is minimized.
The recent literature on implicit bias invites renewed attention to a literature on the circumstances in which law prohibits practices that are ne face but have a discriminatory impact. (Sullivan 2005) . Charles Lawrenc question in the context of constitutional law, arguing that when a law dispar a non-white group it should be unconstitutional if that disparate impac entrenches negative social or cultural meanings about that non-white grou 1987). If his "cultural meaning" test were employed in the context of economically rational neutral employment practice ugh word of mouth such that table staff were predominantly Anglo busboys were predominantly Latino men --would be illegal if it fostered n stereotypes. If implicit bias exists as a kind of background norm, maybe we evidentiary and conceptual position to ascertain whether facially neutral ex an adverse employment action -such as that the plaintiff had a poor at difficult to get along with -are in fact evidence of racial bias. Doctrinally, the challenge would be to distinguish the legitimate explanations from the illegitimate ones. In other words, how do we kno 5/29/2008 jewelry." (490 U.S. 228, 235) Absent the comments about her appearanc courts identify bias in comments about "abrasiveness"? In part because of the 1980s witnessed a pointed contestation about whether disparate impact dominant framework for adjudicating discrimination claims. Lawrence's p were based on Freudian notions (a e, how should this difficulty, should be the roposals that nd a prior generation of research) are now being rev the IAT test ious racism is n claims be loyer is in the (or hold the er did not intend. Should law focus on whether an i urn on intent? perienced a unconscious y outcomes. regated invites continued scholarly attention to the question. Incomplete consciousness looks to be a prime candidate to explain the persistence of inequality in the absence of evidence of the sort of that existed half a century ago, but studying the phenomenon and designing lega ecause of the ion that black ssimilate into s," (Robinson discussions of es who might o mainstream levant to the rity of some thought to be scrimination was deemed to be a reac Irish, Italian, tieth century assimilated into American culture and jettisoned the ways of the "old world," they would ascend the social and economic hierarchy, join elite social groups, and lose their outsider status. The idea that various immigrant groups could assimilate rendered institutional exclusion passé and offered an optimistic story that all forms of discriminationparticularly racial discrimination-could be transcended over time.
The immigrant assimilation story has not gone unchallenged. The literature on white ethnics-and particularly Jewish and Irish people-demonstrates the way in which isited in the context of the recent empirical research such as that on (Connecticut Law Review Symposium 2007) .
A final question has to do with legitimacy. Assuming that unconsc real and can be doctrinally managed, should unconscious discriminatio cognizable? If discrimination is inadvertent, then it is not clear that the emp best position to prevent it. Scholars debate whether law should "punish" employer liable for) something the manag nstitutional decision-maker did something "wrong," and does "wrong" t Or should law focus on whether an employee or a prospective employee ex recognizable harm? (Bagenstos 2003; Jolls 2001) .
There is no consensus on the question of whether subconscious and discrimination play a meaningful role in producing discriminator Nevertheless, the fact that employment remains racially seg overt bias l rules to address it remain vexing empirical and theoretical problems.
Performance and Assimilation
Ordinarily we do not think of race in terms of assimilation, in part b claim that that one's capacity to assimilate is itself racialized. Thus the not people, because they are (physically marked as) black cannot fully a mainstream society. Because of the currency of this "impossibility thesi 2001 ; Inniss 1999; Jaynes & Williams 1989; Haley & Malcolm X 1965) assimilation tend to be class-oriented. As blacks and other racial minoriti have once been subject to the impossibility thesis are being included int working environments, however, the assimilation question is becoming re operation of contemporary race discrimination.
After the decline of public discussion of the alleged racial inferio European immigrant groups, discrimination against immigrants was rarely about immigrant status per se. More frequently, this di tion to perceived lower-class behavior. The thinking was that once the Jewish, Eastern and Southern European immigrants of the early twen racism can actually facilitate assimilation. Both the Irish and the Jews because of the existence (not the absence) of racism. (Ignatiev 1995 ize blackness regardless of eived as being "more" or "less" black based on their skin color, hair, or facial structure, or their class status, accent, manner of dress or deportment. If race is an expressive identity that can be constituted by language, accent, demeanor, or dress, where does race end and ethnicity begin?
As racial minorities are being included in mainstream workplaces as nominal equals (as opposed to as invisible support staff), they are simultaneously also being asked to assimilate. This assimilatory demand creates an incentive for employees to play with tral normative question this literature presents is whether people should give up some aspect of their identity-for, example, language-in ord mainstream American society and its institutions. (Rodriguez 2006; Haney The issue of "fit" is directly applicable to race. One way to make t focus on Latinas/os as a racial group. To extent tha , the pressures they experience to fit in are necessarily racial pressures difficulty with this argument is the racial assumption about Latinas/os it refl are a single racial group. It may be more accurate to say that Latinas/os occ categories-white, mestizo, black, Indian, etc. (Rivera 2007) There is another way to make the argument about "fit" and race depend on conceptualizing Latinas/os as a single racial group. We ar conceptual position to understand this argument once we move away fro phenotypic understanding of race to a performative understanding. Acro workplaces, employees are being asked-explicitly and implicitly-to shape aspe their identity to fit into a dominant workplace culture. Assimilation may ta changing one's appearance, attending to diction, or adopting particular lively debate addresses the question whether assimilationist pre e debated, for example, whether it is racial discrimination to prohibit from wearing their hair in braids. (Caldwell 1991; Rosette 2007; Flagg 200 who see pressure to assimilate as a form of race discrimination debate discrimination law is the best doctrinal method to challenge employment demand assimilation. (Fisk 2006; Selmi 2006) More broadly, does concep as a
The dominant anti-discrimination approach has been to conceptual as a fixed and static racial category. To be black was simply to be black, the way in which some persons of African or Caribbean ancestry were perc their racial identity-to push and pull it at the margins-in non-phenotyp implications of this racial flexibility for anti-discrimination law will be question employment discrimination scholars will be forced to eng fundamentally, scholars are beginning to think about how to articulate whe of race begin an ic terms. The precisely the age. More re the borders d where race shades into class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation (none of cept sometimes ethnicity -is currently a protected status under federal antidisc mination and employer to ieves will not ost forms of ld artificially stances, it is possessing or netic or other th physical or be barriers to ught not (the imarily in the m of rational accommodate that if, after ned the workplace to eliminate barriers to one worker's bein to contribute t of particular condition. A s a kind of s of disability ed, eliminate agined. An tion was not cities of some g the bias in vators and ramps rather than stairs the dominant way of building. Eliminating the bias in favor of men with stay-at-home wives would make flexibility in schedule and working from home the norm, rather than the 9-to-6 day or 24/7/365 availability. The idea behind de-biasing was to restructure the institution of work and the norms about what constitutes "hard work" and a "good worker" so as to include more "different" kinds of people within the social norm of the capable worker. Central to this project was the realization that different workers might have to be included in the workplace on different terms. which -ex rimination law).
Rational Discrimination and Accommodation
Though not always explicitly framed in this way, rational discri accommodation present an after-inclusion problem. Is it rational for an refuse to hire people whose productivity, after inclusion, the employer bel be on par with that of other employees? Although early work assumed that m discrimination were economically irrational because the employer wou constrict its pool of talent, scholars have observed that in many circum economically rational for an employer to discriminate against people lacking a certain trait. Employers might prefer not to hire people with ge proclivity to illness or injury, or women of childbearing age, or people wi mental disabilities. Through a lively debate about which traits ought to occupational equality (differential work ethics, for example) and which o ability to see, hear, or walk, or having children), a number of scholars, pr area of disability and gender, argued that law should address the proble discrimination by imposing an affirmative obligation on employers to certain traits. (Bagenstos 2006; Jolls 2001; Fisk 1986 ) The notion is inclusion, the employer redesig g able to work as productively as another, the ability of each employee to the employer's profits is on par with every other employee's and the cos conditions will no longer be borne solely by the individuals who have the duty to accommodate difference, therefore, can be conceptualized a preferential treatment after inclusion.
Accommodation mandates would not only spread some of the cost from individuals onto society as a whole, they would, proponents hop stereotypes by forcing employers to see that many prospective employees could accomplish much more in a job than the employer might have im accommodation mandate would thus show in some cases that accommoda really required at all, except to overcome an employer's bias about the capa employees. Another goal of accommodation was de-biasing. Eliminatin favor of able-bodied persons would make ele
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The concepts of rational discrimination and accommodation are de controversial with respect to race than with respect to disability and pregn of scholarship in the 1960s staked out the position that, by and large, ra irrational. (Schuman & Harding 1964; Simpson & Yinger 1958) . The e instances in which an employer who herself harbored no racial animus disc order to accommodate customers' racist preferences. More recently, howeve scholars have struggled to determine whether discrimination that i generalizations about statistically significant differences between race condemned as simple stereotyping or should be understood as a kin disc cidedly more ancy. A wave cial bias was xception was riminated in r, courts and s based on s should be d of rational employers to on firms the employ. lack men and based on the middle-aged ericans have as between a b candidate who graduated from the same college, the white can entering the achievement discriminate ployer could ck candidate is less qualified that a white can s but give the this disparate otion than the in which the First, should nswer is yes, ion that antiost of certain ggest that the n if they are ative action, mative action f course, this ent may, for example, under-predict job performance of outsiders who do not compete on a level playing field in school. That is, a variety of institutional dynamics might negatively affect academic achievement of non-white students in predominantly white schools and poor resources might negatively affect the academic achievement of non-white students in predominantly non-white schools. Regardless of whether affirmative action beneficiaries perform less well than their counterparts, to the extent that that perception exists-and is instantiated in law-scholars are going to continue to struggle with whether the language rimination. In either case, the question is whether law should compel revise their judgments about the capable worker, even if it means imposing cost of hiring a worker who turns out to be more risky or more expensive to
Consider an employer who knows the incarceration rates of young b middle-aged white women. The employer might prefer to hire the latter conclusion that young black men are far more likely to be criminals than white women. Similarly, an employer who knows that many African Am been beneficiaries of affirmative action in education might conclude that, black and a white jo didate might have had higher predictors of academic achievement upon school. (Sander 2006) . If the employer believes that predictors of academic are correlated with job performance, the employer might rationally choose to against the black candidate.
This problem could occur after inclusion as well. That is, an em decide that, because of affirmative action, a bla didate. The employer could nevertheless decide to hire both candidate white candidate more and better work. Over the course of several years, treatment could result in the white candidate being more qualified for prom black candidate. This "more qualified" status is directly a result of the way white and black candidates were treated after inclusion.
The foregoing examples raise at least the following two questions. they be conceptualized as rational discrimination? Second, assuming the a how do we think about accommodation? Commitment to a robust not discrimination law should spread from individuals to firms some of the c traits (e.g., a greater likelihood of having a prior criminal record) might su law should compel employers to take a chance on young black men, eve statistically more likely to have criminal records. With respect to affirm some argue that, in effect, it "accommodates" the fact that the affir beneficiaries might not do as well on the job as the other applicants. O formulation can be contested. Traditional measures of academic achievem of rational discrimination and its concomitant, accommodation, ought to be the racial context. If the answer is yes, should accommodation transce context and operate after inclusion? Some already argue that the line b discrimination (in the r applicable to nd the hiring etween antiace context) and accommodation (in the disability context) is incoherent. (Bagenstos 2003) they become mpowered to l barometers, cial climate of d, more particularly, to determine the presence or absence of intentional disc e of the first n they do the e worse than ve the racial rupt negative could have uce a scenario ing an Asian about alleged Still another harshly than -monitor their discriminate a-racial racial r otherwise at monitor their are racially s to shore up are not going ployees better romote those who are most ck employees bring suit? One line of cases suggests that the answer might be yes; that intra-racial discrimination might be cognizable under Title VII. For example, courts have long recognized colorism cases-that is, cases in which a black person discriminates against another black based on the fact that that person is too dark or too light. (Banks 2000; Jones 2000; Hernandez 2007) . But courts also employ the fact that the discrimination plaintiff and the institutional decision-maker are of the same race to find an absence of discrimination. This creates an incentive for majority-white firms to structure their line of
Intra-racial Discrimination
As more racial minorities successfully climb the workplace ladder, part of the decision-making apparatus. They become institutionally e influence the hiring and firing of other outsiders. They also become racia which is to say, their white counterparts will turn to them to ascertain the ra the workplace an rimination in the workplace. (Carbado & Gulati 2004) . But what if som generation of outsiders treat members of their own racial groups worse tha white employees?
Consider why black managers might treat junior black employe junior white employees. Black managers might believe that non-whites ha burden of working twice as hard as whites; anything less would not dis racial stereotypes of the group. Alternatively, the senior black employee internalized negative stereotypes of their own racial group. This could prod in which, for example, a black manager racially allocates work, preferr American employee over her black counterpart based on racial stereotypes disparity between Asian-American and African-American work ethics. reason to think blacks in leadership positions might treat junior blacks more junior whites relates to self-monitoring; blacks might be less inclined to self racial interactions with other blacks on the view that they are not likely to against members of their own racial group. In other words, because intr discrimination might be unintelligible or unimaginable to black managers o odds with their sense of racial commitment and community, they do not interactions with their junior black colleagues to ascertain whether they infused. In addition, black managers might mistreat their black employee their own standing in the firm or to prove to their white colleagues that they to engage in racial favoritism. (Carbado & Gulati 2004) Apart from the question of whether black managers treat black employees worse than white employees is the question of whether they treat some black em than others. Assume that Paul, a black manager, is more than happy to p black employees who perform their race in a particular way-that is, those conforming in terms of their institutional behavior. Can the disfavored bla authority so that it appears that hiring and firing decisions involving non-wh by non-whites. Of course, some institutions will have more institution others to engage in such strategic behavior. The point is that, if a firm is disc ites are made al space than worried about the intra-race ass. At some ook like class scribed. This n and identity nds and race cause of our er picks one typically black person (and both are phe kin problem), ns there is no l. Consider a raduate of an enjoys playing squash rather than a working class, evangelical gra An argument t play at well. outside of its t or one thing, rinally, classeople believe economically advantaged, eptual, doctrinal, and political difficulties with class makes race as a category around which to organize both lega nti-discrimination work all the more important. Scholars will therefore continue to think critically and carefully about where to draw the race/class line ape how we rate treatment
Much work has documented the myriad ways in which race is socially constructed. (Gross 1998; Harris 2001; Crenshaw 2005) The claim that race is a social construction is deeply implicated in what we call inclusive exclusion. The terms upon which outsiders are included in the workplace and the ways in which they perform their racial identity after inclusion constructs race as well. Consider this point with respect to the widely shared belief that diversity is good for business. Sometimes this commitment to diversity is so diluted that it comes to mean anything but racial diversity. rimination, it can structure things so that the key decisions are made in context.
Another difficulty with intra-racial race discrimination cases is cl point, a black manager's preference for another black person begins to l discrimination. How we dress, speak, and comport ourselves are class in does not mean that race is not also at play. As with the issues of assimilatio performance discussed above, it becomes difficult to know where class e begins. (Malamud 2003) . This problem of class is all the more salient be tendency to view race as phenotype. To the extent that a black manag phenotypically black person over another pheno notypcially black in the same way-i.e., there is not a dark skin/light s there is no discrimination on the basis of phenotype. For many, that mea discrimination on the basis of race. (Carbado & Gulati 2003) .
Significantly, this problem exists with respect to whites as wel scenario in which a white manager hires or promotes a mainline Protestant g Ivy League college who duate of a Southern Bible college who enjoys watching Nascar races. can be made that this is purely class discrimination. But, plausibly, race is a The very notion of a southern hick or a redneck does not make sense historical racial association.
Much is at stake, doctrinally and politically, with respect to whether an alleged ac of discrimination is framed as class-based rather than a race-based claim. F class is notoriously difficult to define. (Malamud 1995) . For another, doct based discrimination claims are not cognizable. Finally, because many p that class identity is fluid, that through hard work and determination the disadvantaged can transcend their class identity and become economically there is little political will to address class inequality. These conc l and political a -and so will courts. How we draw this line after inclusion will sh respond to instances in which outsiders (particular juniors) experience dispa in the workplace at the hands of other outsiders (particularly seniors).
Racial Endogeneity
5/29/2008 (Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-Drita 2000) . But when diversity means racial d firm decides to reduce the real or perceived reputational and econo maintaining an all-white workplace, the firm's diversity hiring will have a effects. It produces (constructs) particular racial types for the workplace iversity and a mic costs of fter inclusion . Put another way t to diversity marker, and it e who "look" light-skinned ted ideas: (1) t that they are ng them. This luded. Under air atures, readily recognizable as blacks -but if they are perceived as less al content of tionalizes its oo, have after that is more ed to certain c or are more e prospective rms of social tive, she acts re otherwise rnatively, the ference to the extent that difference causes grit lty), diverse e the grit and his approach of managing os, race is not nd therefore another way, in the context of hiring, employers make dec , how they do t example the cond example does so by focusing on social meaning. These two approaches produce two different categories of black people for the workplace. Third, how employers operationalize diversity can produce an inclusive exclusion whereby the inclusion of some blacks is accomplished by the exclusion of others.
Racial endogeneity is not just a function of how employers screen prospective employees, it is also a function of how employees define themselves in the workplace after inclusion. A person of black and white parentage might define herself as bi-racial, , how an employer understands and operationalizes its commitmen shapes the racial identity of the people within the workplace.
If an employer understands race to be nothing more than a physical wants a diverse workplace based on skin color, it will employ black peopl "black." Under such a scenario, the employer might discriminate against blacks-blacks who could pass for whites-based on one of two inter-rela that really light-skinned blacks are simply not black enough and (2) the fac not black enough means that the firm won't get any diversity credits for hiri would not necessarily mean that all light-skinned blacks would be exc American rules of racial recognition, many fair skinned black people are, based on h texture and facial fe black, their diversity value is reduced. The point is that the raci employees after inclusion is a direct result of the how the employer opera commitment to diversity.
There are other approaches to race an employer could take. These, t inclusion effects. An employer could, for example, take a view of race focused on social meaning: black people have rhythm or are more attun aspects of pop culture or are lazy; white people are less hip or less athleti industrious. Under this approach, the question is not simply whether th employee is black in terms of physicality but whether she is black in te behavior. Crudely, the question is whether, from the employer's perspec black. The employer could believe that people who act black or who a racially salient are more likely to embody negative racial stereotypes. Alte employer could worry about the cost of dif rather than grease (division and distrust rather than teamwork and loya workplaces are difficult to manage. (Langevoort 2004) . One way to reduc advance diversity is to hire people who look black but act white. T simultaneously maximizes diversity and reduces the transaction costs difference. (Carbado & Gulati 2003; Yoshino 2006) Three points about the foregoing bear mention. First, in both scenari exogenous to the employment process. It is in part constituted in a endogenous to that process. Put isions about what race is-which is to say, they construct race. Second so shapes the identities of the employees after inclusion. While in the firs employer constructs race by focusing on physicality, the employer in the se not black. Perhaps she does so because she fears that a black racial desig with it the baggage of negative racial stereotypes. Alternatively, she may n as black because she does not want to be viewed as a beneficiary of affir Perhaps she feels that her racial identity is determined by whether she was parent but not another, or by whether her family associated m nation carries ot self-define mative action. raised by one ore with "black culture" or "wh is a function ential problem de the racial s because bin, white and e firm place a defer to the black-to the tion implications-doctrinally and normativelyof a firm doing this? And does the answer to that question change if affirmative action le in the original hire (where, presumably, the employee in question was not con iscrimination doctrinal, and empirical growth. In an area of law that over its first several decades was prone to reasing racial andonment of ade might be ng, revealing, ategory and a holarship has clare whether Specifically, of minorities ce and gender n judging in the anti-discrimination context. (cf. Boyd et al. 2007 , Peresie 2005 . The nature and meaning of race remain in flux in society and in law and social science scholarship. In studying this, legal scholarship has participated in a transformation of our ding of the role of race in society and of the nature and sources of racial inequality, even as courts have all but given up on doing anything about it. Indeed, the general hostility (and occasional sympathy) of courts to anti-discrimination cases might itself provide the next generation of discrimination scholars with fascinating material for study.
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ite culture." Or perhaps the employee believes that one's racial identity of simple mathematics: black + white = ½ white and ½ black, or bi-racial.
Whatever the employee's reasons for self definition, it creates a pot for a firm interested in promoting diversity. When employers provi demographics of their workplaces, bi-racial is rarely a category -perhap racial is barely cognizable. The standard racial categories are black, Asia Native American. Within which of the foregoing racial boxes should th person who explicitly identifies as bi-racial? Is the firm obliged to employee's self-definition or can it choose the category to ascribe -i.e., employee? What are the anti-discrimina played a ro sulted on his preferred racial classification).
III. Conclusion
While courts in the last decade have often evinced hostility to anti-d claims, the scholarship in the area has experienced bountiful theoretical, narratives either of progress (stories of law facilitating racial uplift and inc harmony) or despair (stories of the persistence of inequality and law's ab the task of ending it), the narrative structure of the scholarship of the last dec described instead as a burrowing in, uncovering, or illuminating.
Turning from metaphors of rise or fall to metaphors of reinterpreti or re-imagining, scholarship has shown how race remains a salient social c powerful predictor and determinant of inequality. Indeed, discrimination sc shown that the racial composition of those empowered officially to de discrimination has occurred affects the meaning of anti-discrimination law. changes in the demographics of the judiciary, including increased numbers and women on the bench, prompts scholars to explore what role, if any, ra has o understan
